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WHAT ARE IMPROPER CORPORATE PURPOSES FOR
NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS?
WILLAM H. WOOD*
Prior to the adoption of the Pennsylvania Nonprofit Corporation Law of
1933,1 nonprofit corporations, or corporations of the first-class, could be formed
for only a single purpose. Furthermore, the permissible single purpose was
restricted to one of the fifteen purposes enumerated in the corporation legislation
of 1874.2
The Legislature apparently recognized that this limitation detracted considerably from the desirability and utility of nonprofit corporations, for in Sec. 201
of the Nonprofit Corporation Law,3 it is provided that such corporations may
be formed "for any purpose or purposes which are lawful and not injurious to
the community." This same provision is reflected in Section 207, 4 which provides
that applications for corporate charters shall be passed upon by the various courts
of common pleas and that incorporation shall be refused unless it appears that
the "purpose or purposes" specified in the proposed articles of incorporation are
"lawful and not injurious to the community."
Accordingly, the only limitation now imposed upon the purposes of nonprofit corporations arises under the legislative requirement that such purposes
shall be "lawful and not injurious to the community." This is not a new concept
in Pennsylvania corporation legislation for, under Sec. 3 of the Act of 1874, 5
a charter could not be granted to a nonprofit corporation unless the corporate
purpose was within one of the classes specified in that act, and unless it was
"lawful and not injurious to the community."
This requirement is a flexible one, as it should be if nonprofit corporations
are to attain their maximum utility. However, an 'examination of the numerous
decisions, both under the Act of 1874 and the Nonprofit Corporation Law,
pertaining to the phrase "lawful and not injurious to the community" reveals
a disconcerting lack of agreement as to its proper construction. A consideration
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of these decisions reveals that the courts have been somewhat overzealous in
refusing applications for non-profit corporate charters.
It will be noted that the great majority of decisions involving this question
are ones in which the court ruled that the corporate purpose under consideration
was unlawful or injurious to the Commonwealth. Thus, there are numerous
examples of improper corporate purposes, but very few reported expressions of
opinion as to permissible corporate purposes. This can probably be explained
by the fact that courts are not so likely to write an opinion if the application for
a charter is approved, nor would such opinion, if written, ordinarily be of such
general interest as to justify its inclusion in the Pennsylvania District or District
and County reports. Nevertheless, it is possible to gain from the available
decisions some general ideas as to the type of corporate purposes which are likely
to be unacceptable to the courts.
As has been indicated, the key terms in the legislative restriction upon the
purposes of nonprofit corporations are "lawful," "not injurious" and "community."
"LAWFUL"

By "lawful" the statute contemplates corporate objectives which do not
contravene any provision or principle of either common or statutory law.
Because of this requirement, a charter has been refused to a nonprofit
corporation on the ground that the proposed corporation was a mere device to
evade the liquor laws through the instrumentality of an alleged social club. 6
A charter has also been refused for thc reason that the real purpose of the
proposed corporation was to secure pecuniary profit for its members, which is, of
course, contrary to the laws governing nonprofit corporations. 7 It should be
noted, however, that an incidental profit to the m-embers of a nonprofit corporation is not objectionable.9
A charter was refused In re Electropathic Institute9 on the ground that to
charter an organization whose members professed to be able to cure disease by
electrical waves would be to contravene the statutes restricting the practice of
mdicine to those possessing higher qualifications.' 0
In Chiropractor'sAss'n. of Pa.1 a charter was refused on the ground that
chiropractors had not yet attained a defined legal status.
6

Slavic Citizens Club, 14 Pa. Dist. 588 (C.

P. 1905); East End Social Club of the Tenth

Ward. 8 Pa. Dist. 272 (C. P. 1899); Jacksonian Club, 11 Pa. C. C. 19, 1 Pa. Dist. 110 (C. P.
1892) ; Lafayette Club, 21 Pa. C. C. 243 (C. P. 1898).
'?Hebeler's Appeal, 296 Pa. 431, 146 At. 26 (1929).
Sin re National League Baseball Club of Philadelphia, 25 W. N. C. 187 (C. P. Pa. 1889).
919
Phila. 128 (C. P. 1880).
10 See also In re American Electropathic Institute's Application, 14 Phila. 128, 37 Leg. Int.
262 (C. P. 1880).
11243 Pa. 547, 90 At!.335 (1914).
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"NOT INjuRIous"
The proper meaning of the words "not injurious" is less definite. These
words may be deemed to involve a considerable variety of elements, depending
in large measure upon the social consciousness of the particular judge before
whom an application for a corporate charter is pending. In this connection it is
to be noted that Sections 201 and 207 of the Nonprofit Corporation Law are
"phrased in the negative rather than the affirmative, in that they require corporate
purposes to be "not injurious" to the community. This is obviously much less
exacting than would be a requirement that corporate purposes be beneficial to
the community. Little more can be said than that a corporate purpose may be
considered injurious if it is fairly apparent, under all the circumstances which
may be expected to surround the operations of the proposed corporation, that the
public moral, physical, social, economic, or cultural well-being of the public will
12
be materially prejudiced if the desired corporation is granted a charter.
In First Church of Christ Scientist' s the master to whom the application for
a charter had been referred reached the conclusion that it would be injurious
to the community to incorporate a group of citizens who would teach the doctrine
that there is no such thing as a contagious disease, or any disease, and practice
the art of curing by prayer those afflictions which are called contagious diseases.
The lower court approved this recommendation of the master and it was affirmed
by the Supreme Court."'
In Russian American Guard's Charter,15 the court held it would be "inexpedient" to grant a charter, because it was apparent that the proposed organization would be comprised of natives of Russia for the purpose of organization,
drill and discipline as a military company. The court indicated that the state
16
statutes furnished ample facilities for such purposes.
17
In Chinese Club, a charter was refused to a Chinese social club on the
ground that there was great danger that the organization might be perverted
to purposes injurious to the community, apparently because the entire board of
directors and twelve of the fifteen subscribers were Chinamen.
8
the court ruled
In In re Hill Top Club's Application for Incorporation,"
that the establishment of a country club for colored persons is not "injurious
to the community" even though neighboring real estate values would be d-epreciated.
12

See Application of the First Church of Christ Scientist, 6 Pa. Dist. 745 (C. P. 1897).
1205 Pa. 534, 55 At. 184 (1903).
14
See Application of the First Church of Christ Scientist, 6 Pa. Dist. 745 (C. P. 1897).
153 Pa. Dist. 673 (C. P. 1893).
16

See also In re Company "'D" Irish Volunteers, 21 Pa. Dist. 913 (C. P. 1912) ; Germania
Sangerbund, 12 Pa. C. C. 89 (C. P. 1891); Italian Mutual Benefit Association, 15 Pa. C. C. 644

(C. P. 1895).

But see Armory Association of Troop A, Sons of Veterans, 25 Pa. Dist. 224

(C. P. 1916).

171 Pa. Dist. 84 (C. P. 1891).
1855 Montg. 56, 34 Pa. D. & C. 592 (C. P. 1939).
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A corporate charter was refused to an organization which proposed to render
mutual assistance to members upon their marriage, such assistance to consist of
assessments levied against the membership. The court indicated that anything
which would induce parties to enter into the marriage relationship through
mercenary motives would strike at the very foundation of human society and
would necessarily be injurious to the community:' 9
20
In the case of In re Appeal of Solebury Mutual Protective Association, a
charter was refused which indicated that the purpose of the corporation was for
the recovery of property stolen from its members or for the reimbursement of
such members in case such property was not recovered. The court stated that the
purpose as thus expressed was injurious to the community because it did not
indicate that punishment of the persons responsible for the crime was also
intended.
A corporate charter was refused in the case of Charter of St. Ladislaus
Roman Catholic Beneficial Ass'n.2l partly because the by-laws provided that the
Hungarian language should be the sole official language used. The court expressed the opinion that a charter should not be granted to an association so
little in sympathy with American institutions as to prohibit the use of the English
language in the transaction of its official business and the deliberations of its
members.
In the case of Businejs Association of Pcnnsylvania,22 the court indicated
that it was a questionable policy to incorporate an organization for the purpose
of influencing the passage, amendment or repeal of legislation.
In re Charter P. L. P. A., 23 it was indicated that a charter for the protection
of personal liberty was unnecessary on the ground that personal liberty was
secured to every one by the laws of the land.
In re Prince of Peace Hospital,24 a charter was refused to a lying-in hospital
which proposed to care for unmarried women during pregnancy. The court
stated that it could not agree that the proposed corporation would not be injurious
to the community for by concealing the true situation, certain women might be
enabled to enter into marriage contracts under false pretenses and also because
the hospital planned to make no provision for caring for the children.
"COMMUNITY"

In using the word "community" in Sections 201 and 207, the Legislature
evidently contemplated not any particular political or geographical unit, but
19
1n re Helping Hand Marriage Association, 15 Phila. 644, 38 Leg. Int. 423, 2 York 177
(C. P. 1881). See also Mutual Aid Ass'n. of North America, for Unmarried Persons, 15 Phila.

625 (C. P. 1881).

203 Montg. 56 (C. P. 1885).
2119 Pa. C. C. 25 (C. P. 1897).
2235 Pa. C. C. 475 (C. P. 1908).
235 L. T. R. (N.

S.)

5 (1883).

2412 Pa. Dist. 242 (C. P. 1902).
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rather the general neighborhood over which the activities of the proposed corporation will likely extend.
COURT'S DISCRETION

Except for the foregoing general observations, it is difficult to formulate
any workable rule for ascertaining whether or not any particular corporate purpose is lawful and not injurious to the community. The language of Sections
201 and 207 is very general, and the discretion which may be exercised by courts
of common pleas in granting or refusing charters to nonprofit corporations is
correspondingly broad.
In the case of PhiladelphiaLabor's Non PartisanLeague Club's Application
for Incorporation,5 the scope of the court's right to review the purpose of a
26
proposed nonprofit corporation is thus described:
"The duty of the court is somewhat different in passing upon charter
applications laid before it from what it is in some other matters,
because it is required by the law to certify that the purpose or purposes given in the articles are lawful and not injurious to the community. The applicants must satisfy the court as to the propriety
of its certificate, 'otherwise,' in the language of the act, 'the court
shall refuse the application.' It should always be born' in mind
that in charter applications the applicants are asking the court for
a special privilege as to the propriety of granting which, its conscience must be satisfied. In Deutsch-Amerikanischer VolksfestVerein, 200 Pa. 143, 145, 49 A. 949, we said: 'The court undoubtedly may and should look into the nature of the proposed
social enjoyment, to see that it is "lawful and not injurious to the
community" '."27
In past decisions under either the Corporation Act of 1874 or the Nonprofit
Corporation Law of 1933 are any criterion, the courts will show no inclination
to restrict the scope of their discretion in granting corporate charters.
In Appeal of Vaux Executor2 8 a proposed corporation for the administration
of certain charitable bequests was refused a charter because it appeared that the
purpose set forth in the articles of incorporation was not in strict conformity with
the provisions of the will.29

25328 Pa. 465, 196 At. 22 (1938).
-6At page 469.
27
See also In re Central Democratic Ass'n. of Phila., 8 Pa. C. C. 392 (C. P. 1889) ; Appeal
of Vaux Executor, 109 Pa. 497 (1885) ; In re Elkland Leather Workers' Ass'n., Inc., 330 Pa. 78,
198 Atd. 13 (1938).
28109 Pa. 497 (1885).
29
See also Curran Foundation Charter, 297 Pa. 272, 146 Atd. 908 (1929).
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In Sullivan County Fishing and Hunting Club,30 a charter was refused to
an organization the purpose of which was the preservation of game and fish by
stocking the territory in a certain township. The court refused the charter because
it did not appear that the proposed corporation owned any real estate in the
township named, nor that it had any proprietary rights in the woods and streams
to be stocked. The court ruled that the invasion of property of others for the
purpose mentioned would make the incorporators trespassers.
In the case of PhiladelphiaLabor's Non PartisanLeague Club's Application,3 1
a charter was refused by the lower court largely because of the supposedly undesirable nature of the incorporators. The action of the lower court was reversed
by the Supreme Court, but the reversal was based upon the fact that the applicants
had not been given opportunity to bL heard in defense.
82
The question involved in In re Animal Humane Society of Pennsylvania
was whether a charter should be granted for a society for the protection of dumb
animals. The court refused the application, saying "a grant of this application
will not be for the best interests of the animals, and will be harmful, rather than
helpful, to the community." The reasons given in support of this refusal were
1. Similar existing societies in thv locality adequately protect animals, and should not have their revenues decreased by the
addition of one more such society.
2. The proposed corporation will be a one-man organization, and
such organizations are usually of short duration.
3. Such societies as the one proposed are given police powers, and
in these days of efficient police forces there should be no increase
in the number of private agencies invested with these powers.
In connection with the last of these reasons the court made the following statement:38
"These societies under existing law are unique in that they are given
police powers and empowered to make arrests and conduct prosecutions. The society shares any fine imposed upon the defendant. In
these days of efficient and well organized public police forces, such
as exist in Lower Merion Township, we look with disfavor upon
any increase in the number of private agencies invested with these
powers. An individual whose compensation may depend to some
extent upon the fines collected is faced with a grave temptation to
3015 Pa. Dist. 650 (C. P. 1907).
31328 Pa. 462, 195 At. 885 (1938).
3233 Pa. D. & C. 327 (C. P. 1938).

SSAt page 329.
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bring unfounded and unnecessary prosecutions, and with perhaps
the help of a cooperating magistrate, oppress the public. This tends
to lower the public conception of the administration of justice, and
hence is injurious to the community."
In Patriotic Sons of IJaly, 84 a charter was refused because the court felt that
the initial fees and dues would be inadequate to meet the expenses which would
necessarily be incurred. Similarly, in Mutual Benefit Society,85 a charter was
refused largely on the ground that the proposed corporation would probably
become insolvent.
In Rox Athletic Association's Charter Application,36 a charter was denied for
the following reason:
"With the preposterous initiation fee of 25 cents and the equally
preposterous monthly dues of 25 cents, it seems asking too much
to designate such a club as a bona fide athletic club. We do not
intend to grant a charter to an organization that cannot exist except
by 'passing the hat' or by procuring a license and selling liquor to
the members, thus adding one more drinking resort to those already
posing as chartered clubs."
The courts have also refused to approve a corporate purpose as lawful be37
cause it was not described with sufficient care and particularity.
Under the prior law the courts sometimes declared that corporate charters
should not be granted for any purpose which could be attained equally well
without incorporation. 38 This requirement was apparently abandoned by the
Supreme Court in the case of Deuisch-Americanischer Volksfest-Verein, 39 although in the case of In re United Sportswear Workers' Union,'O decided under
Sections 201 and 207, there is an intimation that it still exists.4 ' However, in
the case of Hill Top Club's Application for Incorporation,42 it was definitely ruled
that a charter would not be refused merely because all purposes of a proposed
corporation could be accomplished without a charter.
STATUTORY EXCEPTIONS

In considering the court's power to determine whether a corporate purpose
is lawful and not injurious to the community, it should be remembered that in
Pitts. 32 (C. P. 1919).
3518 Pa. Dist. 681 (C. P. 1909).
80318 Pa. 258, 178 At. 464 (1935).
371n re William Betz, Jri. Voters League, 21 Pa. D. & C. 357 (C. P. 1934); In re United
Sportswear
Workers' Union, 29 Pa. D. & C. 622 (C. P. 1937).
38
Chinese Club, 1 Pa. Dist. 84 (C. P. 1892).
89200 Pa. 143, 49 Atd. 949 (1901).
4029 Pa. D. & C. 622 (C,P. 1937).
41See also Rox Athletic Ass'n's Charter Application, 318 Pa. 258, 178 Atd. 464 (1935).
4254 Montg. 56, 34 Pa. D. & C. 592 (C. P. 1939).
3467
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certain specified cases approval of a proposed charter must also be obtained from
other agencies.
Thus, under Sections 211 and 212 of the Nonprofit Corporation Law, educational institutions desiring to confer degrees, and charitable and eleemosynary
institutions, must secure the approval of the State Council of Education and the
Department of Welfare of the Commonwealth, respectively, before the court
may grant a charter. Similarly, under the Acts of 1937, 48 corporations proposing
to provide group hospitalization must secure approval of their charters from the
Insurance Department.
In these particular cases the court must withhold approval of the charter
unless the organization secures the approval of the required agency. However,
even after the required approval has been secured, the court has the same power
as in other cases to determine independently whether the corporate purpose is
lawful and not injurious to the community.
APPEAL

The question occasionally arises as to whether there is any right to an
appellate review of a court's determination that a corporate purpose is unlawful
or injurious to the community. It has been held that, since the statute is silent
on this point, the decree of the lower court may be brought before the Supreme
Court by way of certiorari. However, under such procedure the scope of review
is limited to a consideration of whether or not the lower court abused its discretion
or committed an error of law. 44 Whether or not the lower court acted wisely
in refusing or granting an application may not be considered." 5
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it is submitted that Sections 201 and 207 of the Nonprofit
Corporation Law of 1933, which permits the formation of nonprofit corporations
for any purpose or purposes which are lawful and not injurious to the community,
are workable and beneficial pieces of legislation.
The restrictions upon the purposes of nonprofit corporations must have
considerable flexibility if this type of corporation is to attain maximum utility.
The temptation which might otherwise exist to form corporations for improper
purposes is largely counteracted when the corporation is nonprofit in nature, and
the Legislature can safely rely upon the courts to exert any additional retardation
which proves necessary in this respect.
48P. L. 1980, 15 PuRD. STATS. (Pa.) 2851-4; P. L. 1948, 15 PURD. STATS. (Pa.) 2851-1301
el req.
4
'41n re Elkland Leather Workers' Ass'n., Inc., 330 Pa. 78, 198 At. 13 (1938).
4SPhiladelphia Labor's Non Partisan League Club's Application for Incorporation, 328 Pa.
465, 196 At. 22 (1958) ; Appeal of Vaux Executor, 109 Pa. 497 (1885); Curran Foundation
Charter, 297 Pa. 272, 146 At]. 908 (1929).
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Even though economists and sociologists might differ irreconcilably as to
whether any particular corporate purpose is injurious to the community, the judges
of tht various courts of common pleas are agencies well calculated to estimate
the practical future effect of a proposed nonprofit corporation. As we have seen,
in isolated cases the courts have advanced unsound reasons in support of their
action in refusing applications for corporate charters. Fortunately these cases
'are few as compared with the great number of charters granted, and any occasional misconception as to the probable social effect of a proposed nonprofit
corporation is less injurious to the people of the Commonwealth than would be
legislation enumerating or further restricting the permissible purposes of such
corporation.
HARRISBURG, PA.
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